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The basics of kin selection theory 
Kin selection theory has its origins in attempt to unlock the puzzle of why some organisms 
have evolved to help other organisms of the same species. Such helping behavior is a puzzle 
because an organism that helps another will likely incur some reproductive cost, such as a loss 
of resources to allocate to its own offspring, increased mortality risk, or reductions in other 
components of Darwinian fitness (i.e., reproductive success). This means that any gene that 
increases the probability of helping behavior will reduce its frequency in future generations 
and ultimately will be lost unless there is some compensating reproductive benefit, i.e., some 
additional path by which helping behavior causes a net increase in the underlying gene's 
frequency.  
William D. Hamilton (1964) provided a pivotal insight into the evolution of altruistic helping 
by pointing out that altruistic acts directed toward relatives produce an important kind of 
reproductive compensation. By enhancing the reproduction of relatives, a help-inducing gene 
indirectly propagates copies of itself in those relatives. When the relatives are the helper's own 
offspring, most authors refer to the helping as 'parental care' and the enhancement of 
propagation of the helping genes is often referred to as a positive 'direct effect' of those genes. 
The power of Hamilton's theory was that it showed that help-inducing genes benefit in an 
essentially identical way when the help is directed toward non-descendant relatives, such as 
siblings. When the latter 'indirect' effect is sufficiently strong, the helping gene can spread 
(increase in frequency in the population) despite decreases in its propagation through the 
offspring of the individual in which it resides (i.e. the positive indirect effects can outweigh 
negative direct effects). Despite the terminology, there is no sense in which 'indirect' effects 
are less robust than 'direct' effects (Dawkins 1979).  
  
There are two distinct, mutually consistent, fitness-accounting methods in quantitative kin 
selection theory: neighbor-modulated fitness or inclusive fitness (Hamilton 1964; Grafen 1982; 
Maynard Smith 1982a; Reeve 1998). Neighbor-modulated fitness, which is closely allied to 
the concept of fitness used in population genetics theory, focuses on the reproductive costs or 
benefits received by an altruist from others (the term "neighbor-modulated" is intended to 
connote fitness influences from the social environment). In contrast, inclusive fitness focuses 
on the reproductive benefits and costs dispensed by an altruist to others (the term "inclusive" 
is used to emphasize that effects of altruism on all kin, not just on oneself, are to be 
combined).  
  
Hamilton showed that both methods of accounting lead to exactly the same condition for the 
spread of altruism, this condition usually termed as "Hamilton's rule". This was an important 
achievement, because inclusive fitness is generally much easier to compute than is 
neighbor-modulated fitness (but there are pitfalls: Grafen 1982) as the latter but not the former 
depends on the population frequency of the altruism allele. 
 
Inclusive fitness  
In the inclusive fitness accounting approach, the focus is on reproductive effects dispensed by 
the individual bearing the altruism-producing gene. The idea is to combine all the dispensed 
reproductive effects of an individual into an "inclusive fitness" for that individual in a way 
that correctly predicts the evolution of the altruism (Hamilton 1964). Hamilton's verbal 
prescription for calculating inclusive fitness was essentially the following: Take the baseline 
personal reproductive output of the individual, add to the latter the effect of the individual's 
behavior on itself (this sum is called the personal component of inclusive fitness), and also 
add the sum of the effects of the individual's behavior on the reproduction of others, weighted 
by the individual's genetic relatedness to those other individuals (this weighted sum is called 
the kin component of inclusive fitness).  The behavior associated with the higher average 
inclusive fitness will spread.  
  
Before computing inclusive fitness, we need a rigorous understanding of the concept of 
genetic relatedness. Relatedness is a measure not of the absolute genetic similarity between 
two individuals (a common misconception), but of the degree to which this similarity exceeds 
the "background" similarity between individuals randomly drawn from the population. One 
way to compute relatedness is to calculate the probability that a given allele in the altruist of 
altruism is present in the recipient of altruism via common descent (Hamilton 1964; Grafen 
1985); this is the genealogical relatedness. (Another way to compute relatedness from genetic 
data is explained in vignette 1.) Having obtained the value of the genetic relatedness r 
between an altruist and a recipient, we can now compute the inclusive fitness. Let the average 
reproductive output of non-altruists be equal to x offspring. This is also the baseline 
reproductive output for altruists, and thus the total personal reproductive component for 
altruists is x-c where c is the cost of altruism. The recipient of altruism receives a mean 
increment b to its reproductive output. It then follows from the definition that the average 
inclusive fitness for altruists is equal to:  
 
     x - c + rb    (1) 
 
Altruism will begin to spread when the inclusive fitness for altruists exceeds the inclusive 
fitness for non-altruists, i.e., when x - c + rb > x, which simplifies to  
 
rb > c.     (2) 
 
The latter condition is the widely used 'Hamilton's rule' for the evolution of altruism. 
Hamilton's rule is easily generalized to encompass multiple interactions with different kinds 
of kin:       
    r i
i =1
N
∑ bi > 0      (3)  
 
where N is the number of kin plus self, relatedness to self equals one and the bi's associated 
with the ith kin classes can be either positive or negative (i.e., either benefits or costs to the 
recipients). Importantly, this rule can be applied to the evolution of any phenotype, not just 
behavioral altruism.  
 
However, the generalized rule has important limitations (review in Grafen, 1985). In 
particular, its use assumes that (i) costs and appropriately weighted benefits can be added (as 
opposed to multiplied or otherwise combined) together to determine the overall fitness effect 
of altruism, (ii) selection is weak enough that the genetic relatedness can be treated as 
constant and equivalent to the genealogical relatedness, and (iii) altruism is random according 
to whether recipients of a given relatedness r actually possess the gene promoting altruism 
(Grafen 1984, 1991). When these assumptions are not met, other methods of for computing 
the evolutionary outcomes of kin selection must be sought (Queller 1992; Frank 1998). 
Importantly, Hamilton's rule is more likely to be valid when altruism is so strongly 
context-dependent that recipients of altruism do not themselves express the same altruism 
(Parker 1989). 
 
Atruism between relatives 
Hamilton's theory of kin selection predicts that an individual will tend to behave differently 
toward conspecifics of different degrees of relatedness, and there are numerous examples 
demonstrating that this is indeed the case. Here we take the example of alarm calls to illustrate 
how variation in kin structure can influence the expression of altruism within groups. 
 
In many social groups of vertebrates, individuals give alarm calls when predators approach. For 
example, when groups of Belding's ground squirrels are threatened by a coyote or a weasel, some 
of the squirrels stand up on their hind legs and produce a high-pitched screech. Callers most 
likely suffer a cost because calling makes them conspicuous and presumably more likely to be 
attacked by the predator. Two lines of evidence suggest that individuals are more likely to give 
alarm calls when surrounded by a higher proportion of relatives. First, there is sex-biased 
dispersal and females are more likely than males to stay close to their natal area, resulting in a 
higher relatedness of females than males to neighbors. Accordingly, females were found to sound 
much more frequently than males. Second, females that had close relatives nearby called more 
frequently than females without (Sherman 1977), again as predicted by kin selection. 
 
In another species of rodent, the black tailed prairie dog, Hoogland (1983) further investigated 
whether individuals behaved differently depending on whether kin were offspring or 
non-descendent relatives. He experimentally studied alarm calling by presenting individuals with 
a stuffed badger, a natural predator. He found that the proportion of times individuals gave an 
alarm call significantly increased when they were surrounded by kin but did not significantly 
vary according to whether these were offspring or non-descendent kin. These results are in line 
with the prediction that warning offspring (i.e., parental care) or sisters (direct and indirect 
effects of altruism, respectively) are, in fact, equivalent ways of increasing propagation of genes 
identical by descent to future generations. 
 
Reproductive altruism in vertebrate societies 
In at least 220 bird and 120 mammal species, young are reared not only by their parents, but by 
other individuals as well. Typically, these helpers are young individuals that help their parents to 
rear younger siblings. The occurrence of such co-operative breeding raises two interconnected 
questions. Why do offspring remain with their parents rather than disperse and attempt to breed 
independently on their own? And why do the offspring that remain at home engage in costly 
tasks, for example collecting food to feed their parent's offspring? 
 
Numerous studies, mainly in birds, suggest that offspring stay home because the opportunities 
for successful dispersal and independent breeding are limited relative to the payoff for staying at 
home. There are several, additive ways by which helping might be beneficial given that offspring 
stay at home. First, helpers may obtain direct benefits, for example by gaining experience and 
thus becoming better parents when they will breed on their own later. Second, helpers may gain 
indirect benefits by increasing the numbers of relatives produced, thereby increasing their 
inclusive fitness. 
 Several lines of evidence demonstrate that kin selection is an important force favouring the 
evolution of co-operative breeding. Both in birds and mammals co-operative breeding seems to 
be largely restricted to family structures composed of close kin. Moreover, in most of the 
co-operative breeding species where it has been investigated it turns out that individuals 
preferentially assist their closest relatives (Emlen 1997). For example, in white-fronted 
bee-eaters, kinship is a strong predictor of both whether a given individual becomes a helper and 
to whom it provides help (Emlen and Wrege 1988). Non-breeders are more likely to become 
helpers when the breeding pairs in their family are close genetic relatives, and when faced with a 
choice of potential recipient nests, they preferentially help the pair to whom they are most closely 
related. 
 
Interestingly, kinship does not only determine whether or not an individual will help, but also the 
amount of help provided. In pied kingfishers, for instance, helpers may be related or unrelated to 
the breeding pair. Related helpers work as hard as the breeding pair, but unrelated ones work less 
(Reyer 1984). Similarly, co-operative breeding Seychelles warblers exhibit significantly higher 
helping efforts (food provisioning and period of helping) when rearing full sibs than when 
rearing half-sibs (Komdeur 1994). Overall, these results demonstrate that, as predicted by kin 
selection, individuals are more likely to help kin than non-kin and that the level of altruism 
increases with relatedness. 
 
Eusociality in insects 
Of all the cases of altruism to be found in the animal kingdom, surely the most extreme is the 
behaviour of the workers in social insects. Some ants, for example, form colonies comprising up 
to one million sterile workers specialising in tasks such as building the nest, collecting food, 
rearing the young and defending the colony. In these colonies reproduction is restricted to one or 
a few individuals, the queens. The term "eusociality" refers to such societies, which are 
characterised by reproductive division of labour, co-operative brood care and (generally) overlap 
of generations. 
 
There is currently no doubt that kin selection has been the all important selective force 
responsible for the evolution of eusociality and reproductive altruism by workers (Bourke and 
Franks 1995; Crozier and Pamilo 1996). Numerous genetic studies have revealed that eusociality 
evolved within groups of highly related individuals, such as one mother and her offspring. There 
are a few ant species in which the relatedness between nestmates is close to zero, but this low 
relatedness stems from an increase in queen number that occurred long after the evolution of 
morphological castes and reproductive division of labour. It is still unclear whether such 
societies are of recent origin and evolutionarily unstable, or whether the benefits of worker 
helping in such societies is large enough so that Hamilton's rule is still satisfied despite the low 
relatedness of workers to the helped brood (Bourke and Franks, 1995; Keller 1995). 
 
Eusociality has evolved independently many times among the insects and most frequently in the 
Hymenoptera (wasps, bees and ants). Interestingly, Hymenoptera have a haplodiploid mechanism 
of sex determination which generates peculiar patterns of relatedness. Because unfertilised eggs 
give rise to males and fertilised eggs to females, sisters always receive the same set of paternal 
genes and therefore share 75% of their genes identical by descent. As a consequence, 
Hymenopteran females are more related to their full sisters than to their own offspring and it has 
been suggested that this may explain the prevalence of eusocial origins in the Hymenoptera 
(Hamilton 1964). The haplodiploidy hypothesis would also explain another interesting feature, 
that workers are exclusively females in social Hymenoptera but not in the termites (which are 
always diploid). 
 
Although the haplodiploid hypothesis is appealing, it turns out that it is not so simple because the 
high relatedness between sisters is balanced by the low relatedness of females to brothers 
(r=0.25). Hence, workers gain by rearing siblings rather than offspring only if workers lay the 
male eggs of if workers can concentrate on raising sisters while males are produced by solitary 
females (Seger 1983). Clearly, these conditions do not apply in contemporary species and it thus 
seems unlikely that haplodiploidy has been a very important factor responsible for the 
maintenance and possibly even origin of eusociality. The fact that most cases of extreme 
reproductive altruism are found in Hymenoptera might be due to other features of this group, for 
example the unusually high frequency of parental care, a useful precursor of evolving care of the 
young of others (Alexander 1974), or the enhanced protection from chance loss that rare alleles 
for worker altruism receive in haplodiploid compared to diploid systems (Reeve 1993).  
 
Conflicts within kin groups 
Although high relatedness favors high levels of co-operation, potential conflicts persist in groups 
composed of kin, whether they are co-operative breeding birds or eusocial insects. Potential 
conflicts arise because, in contrast to cells of an organism, group members are not genetically 
identical. Hence, kin selection predicts that individuals with partially divergent genetic interests 
may attempt to favor the propagation of their own genes, possibly to the detriment of other group 
members. Group members can compete over direct reproduction or over how to allocate group 
resources to various relatives, and the potential conflict may translate into actual conflict or may 
remain unexpressed (Ratnieks and Reeve 1992). Interestingly, the study of conflicts provides 
some of the best tests of kin selection, as illustrated by the patterns of allocation of resources to 
the production of male and female reproductives in social Hymenoptera. 
 
Kin selection theory predicts that the value of new queens and males is influenced by their 
relatedness to other colony members (Hamilton 1964). The haplodiploid sex-determination 
system in social Hymenoptera results in asymmetries in the relatedness of workers to females 
and males with, in colonies headed by a single queen, workers being three times more related to 
new sister queens than they are to their brothers. Thus, the equilibrium is a 3:1 biased population 
sex-investment ratio in favor of females if workers control colony sex ratios. In contrast, because 
queens are equally related to their sons and daughters, the equilibrium ratio should be an even 
investment in males and females if queens control colony sex ratios. Therefore, kin selection 
predicts a conflict between queens and workers over sex investment ratios (Trivers and Hare 
1976). 
 
Cross-species comparison of population-level sex investment ratios in ants that generally have a 
single queen per colony showed that the population sex investment ratio is globally 
female-biased (1.7:1). This indicates that workers have some control over colony sex ratios and 
that, as predicted by kin selection, they bias sex investment toward females. Unfortunately, it is 
very difficult to reliably assess the relative cost of production of males and queens, and a 
proportion of the ant species in this comparative study probably depart from the simple family 
structure expected when the colony is headed by one queen mated with a single male. As a result, 
interspecific comparisons of this type do not allow precise determination of the theoretically 
expected and observed population-wide investment sex ratios and thus the relative power of 
queens and workers in biasing colony sex ratios to their advantage.  
 
The most complete demonstration of queen-worker conflict over sex allocation and an all 
important role of kin selection comes from a study in the ant Formica exsecta (Sundström et al. 
1996). The study population consists of colonies headed by single queens mated with either one 
or multiple males. Multiple mating by queens decreases the relatedness between workers and the 
new queens to be raised but does not influence the relatedness of workers to males. Theory 
shows that, under such conditions, worker maximize their inclusive fitness by producing the sex 
to which they are most related compared to the population average, that is new queens in nests 
headed by a singly-mated queen and males in colonies with a multiple-mated queen (Boomsma 
and Grafen 1990). The queen controls the primary proportion of males and females by regulating 
the proportion of haploid and diploid eggs she lays. However, workers may subsequently modify 
the sex investment ratio by selective rearing of the brood. Comparison of sex ratio at the egg and 
adult stage showed that workers eliminated a high proportion of males in colonies headed by 
single-mated queens, leading these colonies to produce mostly females. By contrast, males were 
kept alive in colonies headed by a multiple-mated queen (Sundström et al. 1996). Hence, in this 
population, workers win the conflict against the queen and bias colony sex ratio so as to 
maximize their inclusive fitness. A similar pattern of relatedness-induced split sex ratio has been 
documented in 16 other species of social Hymenoptera (Queller and Strassmann 1998). In some 
other species, however, there is apparently no association between sex ratio and colony level 
relatedness , suggesting that queens may also have some means to achieve their colony sex ratio 
interests, for example by limiting the number of female eggs produced (Pamilo 1982; Reuter and 
Keller 2001; Aron et al. in press). 
 
Overall, studies of sex allocation in social Hymenoptera and other within-group conflicts (e.g., 
Pfennig 1993) demonstrate that the nature and expression of many conflicts depends on the 
genetic structure of the group, as predicted by kin selection theory. Paradoxically, the outcomes 
of within-group conflicts strongly support kin selection theory, a theory which was first proposed 
to explain the evolution of co-operation! More generally, these conflicts also reflect the most 
basic principle of Darwinian evolution, namely that organisms are selected to maximize the 
number of copies of their own genes transmitted to the next generation. 
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Vignette 1: Computing relatedness from genetic data 
Relatedness can be computed from genetic data as follows (Queller and Goodknight 1989; 
Reeve et al. 1992): Let A be the average frequency of the altruism gene in altruists, p be the 
population-average frequency of the altruism gene, and R be the average frequency of the 
altruism allele in the kin group within which an altruist interacts. Then it can be shown that Ar 
+ (1-r')p = R (Grafen 1985, 1991), where r is the "regression measure of relatedness" (so 
called because it is equal to the slope of the regression of the gene frequency of an individual's 
group on the gene frequency within the individual). Rearranging the latter equation, r = (R - 
p)/(A - p). The regression measure of relatedness is essentially identical to the genealogical 
measure of relatedness r when selection is not too strong (Grafen 1985, 1991). This measure 
of relatedness nicely illustrates that relatedness depends on above-background genetic 
similarity (R - p), not only on the absolute genetic similarity (R) between altruists and 
recipients. 
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